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INVESTIGATION OF SA-501 S- IVB AUXIL IARY 
PROPULS ION SYSTEM FLIGHT ANOMALIES 
SUMMARY 
Several anomalies occurred on the S-IVB auxiliary propulsion system 
during the SA-50i flight. The anomalies of primary significance were low 
chamber pressure for  several  engines beginning at the start of the S-IVB 
powered flight and high propellant temperatures experienced late in flight. 
An investigation of possible causes by theoretical analysis and hardware testing 
was conducted by MSFC. 
perature w a s  caused by a degradation of the Auxi l ia ry  Propulsion System (APS) 
module surface paint thermal properties, which in turn was caused by S-I1 
stage retro-rocket exhaust gas plume impingement. The cause of the anomalous 
chamber pressures  of several  engines at the beginning of S-IVB powered flight 
was verified by testing to be contamination of the engine injector because of 
"burp firing" at ambient conditions at KSC. The investigation resulted in the 
deletion of the "burp firing" requirement pr ior  to launch at KSC and in modifi- 
cation to the APS hardware to prevent the temperature r i se  of the propellant. 
The analyses indicated that the high propellant tem- 
I NTRO D U CT I ON 
The SA-501 post flight evaluation revealed several  discrepancies in the 
operation of the S-IVB Stage APS. During the flight the system had appeared 
to be operating in a nominal manner and control of the vehicle w a s  maintained 
within acceptable limits. No effects of the anomalies were noted on the stage 
operation. The primary mission of the flight was to verify the adequacy of the 
launch vehicle design, Service Module design, and Command Module heat shield 
design. In addition, several  maneuvers were performed to test the communica- 
tions adequacy. The orientation experienced by the stage during the extraneous 
maneuvers was not considered to be a normal Saturn V mission requirement. 
Since the amount and quality of flight data received was limited, the 
degree of analysis that was performed was also limited and assumptions, 
theoretical calculations , and ground testing were relied upon for several  areas 
under investigation. 
performed by the Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering Laboratory and Test  
Laboratory of the Marshall Space Flight Center. 
This document contains the results of the investigation 
M I SS I ON REQU I REMENTS 
The Auxiliary Propulsion System is designed to provide attitude control 
and propellant settling capability for the S-IVB stage. The propellant settling 
capability is unique to  the Saturn V application and does not exist for  the Saturn 
I-B system. The APS provides roll  control during 5-2 engine powered phases 
of flight, and provides pitch, yaw , and roll control during coast periods. The 
system is also required to perform several  maneuvers for  landmark sightings, 
undocking, docking, etc. The ullage engine is required to fire immediately 
following injection into orbit to keep propellants settled at 5-2 engine cutoff 
before opening the continuous vent valve. 
during recirculation chilldown of the 5-2 engine pr ior  to restart. 
The engine is required to fire again 
The minimum impulse bit (MIB) required of the engines for attitude 
control is 7. 5 lb  sec. 
SYSTEM DESCR I PTION 
The Saturn V/S-IVB APS consists primarily of a pressurization sub- 
system , propellant subsystem , engines , and instrumentation. A schematic of 
the system is shown in Figure I .  An isometric view of the component and 
instrumentation locations within the module is shown in Figure 2. The APS is 
built in a modular concept in which all subsystems are enclosed inside the 
structural fairing. Two modules are located on the stage 180 degrees apart  on 
the aft skirt. 
stage to control the firing of the engines. 
Electrical signals a r e  generated from the Instrument Unit and 
The pressurization system consists of a helium tank, a two-stage 
regulator, quad check valves, a low pressure helium module (which contains 
relief and solenoid valves) , and helium f i l l  check valves. The initial helium 
bottle pressure is 3100 psig and is regulated to 196 psia. In the event of a 
primary regulator failure (wide open or  regulating to higher limits is normal 
failure mode) , the secondary regulator reduces the pressure to 200 psia. 
quad check valves reduce migration of propellant vapors upstream from the 
The , 
propellant tanks to prevent a mixing of explosive propellant vapors. 
monomethylhydrazine (MMH) and the other containing nitrogen tetroxide ( N2 04), 
1 
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The propellant subsystem consists of two propellant tanks ( one containing i 
j 
I line filter, f i l l  and drain valves, and propellant distribution lines. Each module 
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FIGURE 2. ISOMETRIC OF MODULE 
contains 127 lbm of MMB and 188 lbm of N2 0, at liftoff. The propellant tanks 
contain teflon bladders to provide positive expulsion of propellant in zero-g 
environment. The f i l l  and drain valves are contained in the propellant control 
module, which also incorporates a filter with a nominal filtration rating of 10 
microns and an absolute rating of 25 microns. 
Three engines in each module are used for  attitude control and operate 
at 147 lbf thrust  each. 
engine provides pitch control. Each engine is equipped with quad solenoid 
valves , in each propellant inlet line , arranged in a series-parallel combination. 
A cutaway of the engine is shown in Figure 3. The inlet to the valve package 
contains a 100 mesh screen ( 150 microns) to protect the engine from large 
particulate contamination. 
is equipped with single solenoid valves in each propellant inlet line. 
Two engines provide roll and yaw control while one 
The ullage engine is operated at 72 lbf thrust, and 
PRE-FL I GHT TEST1 NG 
The modules used for  SA-501 and SA-502 undergo tests that a r e  unique 
in that no other Saturn V flight modules a re  hot fired before installation on the 
flight stage at KSC. 
inert fluids at the Santa Monica facility. 
functional and electro-m echanical checks. 
Al l  APS modules a re  functionally acceptance tested with 
These tests consists of leak and 
Following the Santa Monica testing, the SA-501 modules were shipped 
to the Sacramento Test Center (STC) , where a pre-firing checkout w a s  con- 
ducted. Following the checkout, a confidence firing was  performed, consisting 
of a total of 217 pulses on the attitude control engines and 2 pulses on the ullage 
engine. During the firing of module I, it was  noted that the performance of 
engine 2 was  marginally low. 
checkout for  use in another test module, a fuel valve stuck open. 
w a s  then shipped to Santa Monica for a failure analysis. During the post firing 
checkout of module 1 a faulty oxidizer propellant control module and leaking 
engine recirculation manifold was revealed. Both components were  replaced. 
The pre-firing checkout of module 2 revealed a sticking fuel valve in engine 2 
and the engine was  replaced. The post firing checkout of module 2 revealed 
excessive leakage through the primary reference pressure  par t  of the regulator 
and excessive leakage through both check valves of the fuel propellant control 
module. Both components were  replaced. 
The engine was later replaced, and, during 
The engine 
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7 F l ) r E L  INLET PORT 
Following the confidence firing, both SA-501 modules were flushed with 
Freon M F  to clean the module for  handling purposes. The modules were  then 
disassembled and components that had been exposed to propellants were cleaned 
by vacuum baking or purging. Defective and obsolete-configuration par ts  w e r e  
replaced during the reassembly process. A final post-firing checkout on each 
APS module was  then performed. 
Following the disassembly and cleaning, it was  discovered that several  
fuel valves in the engines were  stuck. An analysis revealed that the module 
fuel components were  not properly cleaned by the procedure of flushing with 
Freon M F  followed by vacuum baking. A hard residue was  found on the engine 
fuel valves and in other components of the fuel systems. All  of the engines 
were replaced and recleaned by the engine vendor. Five of the six engines 
used to replace the original 501 module engines had been previously used for  
the SA-502 APS module confidence firings. The SA-502 modules had experienced 
the same contamination as SA-501 modules. The engines valves were removed 
and replaced with new ones and the injectors cleaned before reassembly into 
the SA-501 modules. The fuel propellant control modules were  replaced and 
all other fuel system components recleaned. 
A f t e r  completion of the delayed reassembly, the modules were shipped 
to  KSC, where a pre-flight checkout w a s  performed. This consisted of leak, 
KSC for  approximately one year. Af t e r  storage the modules underwent pre- 
liminary checkout and were  assembled to the stage. The modules were then 
given a preloading checkout. During loading operations an oxidizer tank bladder 
in module 2 was inadvertently overpressurized, and subsequently was  replaced. 
. functional, and electro-mechanical checks. The modules were then stored at  
A "burp" firing was conducted on the APS engines on November 3, 1967, 
six days before launch. 
clearing burst, followed by two 65 milliseconds pulses on each attitude control 
engine with each ullage engine fired for approximately 430 milliseconds. Al l  
except engine 3 of module 2 exhibited nominal performance. 
chamber pressure trace indicated a slow and uncharacteristic buildup. Af t e r  
examining the possible failure modes, it was concluded that the anomaly was  
caused by instrumentation, and the system w a s  judged to be adequate for flight. 
It was  noted during the post flight evaluation that the thrust  decay as denoted by 
Pc  was  slower on engine 4 module I than engine 4 module 2. A re-examination 
of burp-firing data revealed that the same result occurred on the pad. 
The burp firing consisted of one 200 milliseconds 
The engine 3 
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FLIGHT RESULTS 
Flight data indicated that attitude control for  the S-IVB was maintained 
within programmed limits throughout the flight in addition to performing all 
required maneuvers. During the flight the pressurization system operated in 
a nominal manner and the usage of propellant and pressurant was  less than had 
been predicted. If the mission had been flown without system evaluation instru- 
mentation, the flight would have been classified as a complete success. 
instrumentation performed the function for  which it was  intended and indicated 
the following anomalies: 
The 
High Propellant Temperature 
Both modules experienced propellant heating, which exceeded expected 
amounts beginning at approximately I1 000 seconds into the mission. The 
temperature of the oxidizer in module I exceeded the limits of the temperature 
transducer ( 5 9 i " R ) .  Traces of the temperature are shown in Figure 4. 
Slow Chamber Pressure Decay of Ullage Engine 
Engine 4 of module 1 exhibited a slower than nominal Pc tailoff for  each 
firing (Fig. 5). 
from.the full value to IO percent value within 35 dsec from cutoff signal. This 
value is based upon the close-coupled transducer used for engine manufacture 
testing and with no surge suppression circuitry. 
The specification requires that the thrust  level shall decay 
Chamber Pressure Osci I lat ions 
Engine I of module I exhibited oscillations in chamber pressure of 
approximately 34 psia peak-to;peak with a frequency of 400 hertz. 
chamber pressure was 80 psia. 
The nominal 
Chamber Pressure Decay 
J 
Engines I and 3 of module 1 decreased in chamber pressure from their 
initial values to a s  low as 55 psia during the mission period from I1 000 seconds 
to 20 000 secofids of flight. 
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Low Chamber Pressures 
. 
Engines I and 3 of module I were approximately 15 psia low in chamber 
pressure from the f i r s t  firings throughout the mission. 
module 2 also exhibited lower Pc in flight than that shown during burp firing. 
Engine I exhibited values from 5 to 10 percent low during the mission. Engine 
2 Pc was  consistently 8 to 10 percent low throughout the flight. Engine 3 Pc 
was  also lower than expected ( < 5  percent) throughout the flight, but was within 
system tolerances. 
and did not cause mission degradation during the flight. 
Engines I and 2 of 
The anomalies listed were noted in the post flight evaluation 
DISCUSSION OF ANOMALIES 
High Propellant Temperatures 
The design of the APS is intended to maintain the propellant temperatures 
within acceptable limits by means of passive control. This is done by means of 
thermal insulators placed in conduction paths to critical components , by insula- 
tion placed around propellant tanks, by polishing of propellant lines, and by 
painting the surface of the module with a thermal reflective paint which keeps 
the absorbtivity to emissivity ratio - to I. 0. According to McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation (MDC) personnel, the effectivity of this coating appeared to be 
degraded (from the anticipated values) during the earth orbital operation. 
During development testing, the APS was subjected to extensive thermal environ- 
mental testing in the MDC high vacuum facility at Huntington Beach. The module 
was subjected to both hot and cold temperature cycling with a normal surface 
coating and with a black surface. The tempera- 
tures in flight could have resulted from one or  a combination of the following: 
a 
E 
No problems were experienced. 
I. ~~~~~ Degraded Surface Paint at Liftoff. The APS modules are normally 
Since the paint is a silicone 
The modules were handled extensively during the 
The paint was degraded 
painted at the Santa Monica manufacturing facility. 
type, it is easily rubbed off. 
confidence firings and subsequent checkout operations. 
to such aneextent that it w a s  deemed necessary to repaint the modules at KSC. 
The effect of the repainting operation is unknown. 
2. Degraded Surface Paint Because of Boost Heating. The effect on 
the surface properties of the paint because of the temperatures experienced 
during boost is not normally considered to cause any degradation. The Saturn 
I-B APS modules are treated in the same manner and undergo a similar boost 
situation, and no problems have been noted to date. The repainting process 
must again be noted as representing an unknown effect. 
3. Degraded Surface Paint Due to  Retro-Rocket _ _ _  Exhaust Plume 
L m p i n g e m e n t m m a l  testing at Huntington Beach included the black paint 
coating in an effort to  produce the worst effect caused by plume impingement. 
It has been noted, however, that the worst case is really some surface properties 
between those represented by the silvery color and black color where the - 
ratio is greater than I. 0. Thus the effect caused by retro-rocket plume im- 
pingement represents another unknown. 
_- - 
a! 
c 
4. Severe Mission Heating Profii. A s  stated previously in the intro- 
The orientation of the stage to the sun was  changed 
duction, several  maneuvers were performed on experiments that are not normal 
to the Saturn V application. 
at M 10 800 seconds which produced a higher heat flux on the oxidizer side of 
module I and fuel side of module 2. The temperature rise began to occur at 
this point. 
Af te r  examining each of the possible causes,  the most logical explanation 
fo r  the anomaly is a combination of ( 3 )  and (4).  Heat  transfer calculations by 
MDC and an examination of the flight data do indicate a degradation of surface 
properties in earth orbit. Since the Saturn I-B modules have been repainted in 
the past  before flight and the surface coating did not deteriorate, cause ( 1) must 
be eliminated. Cause (2 )  can also be eliminated because of similarity to 
Saturn I-B, and the fact that the most severe degradation of the paint, if caused 
by boost heating, would have occurred on the nose of the module with ve'ry little 
heating on the aft end. 
modules towards the sun indicates just the opposite effect. 
tion of ( 3 )  and ( 4) represents the most probable cause of the anomaly. 
The heating caused by orientation of the aft ends of 
Thus the combina- 
Slow Chamber Pressure Decay of Ullage Engine 
A s  shown in Figure 5, the pressure decay for  engine 4 of module I w a s  
slower than specification limits. The data received represents the first flight 
environment chamber pressure data ever received for  this engine. The decay 
characteristics are a function of the distance of the pressure detection device 
from the source of the pressure and the size and volume of line leading to the 
pressure transducer. The amount of time for  decay of the engine from cutoff 
to 10 percent Pc was  less than I second. 
engine w a s  repeatable for  both starts in space, and appears to be similar in 
The cutoff characteristic for  the 
12 
0 
time to the tailoff in the sea level burp firings. The data were discussed with 
Rocketdyne ( engine vendor) and their opinion was  that the engine performed 
satisfactorily and such traces had been noted in some of their sea level testing. 
However, the flight trace was different from that nominally expected. Possible 
causes for  the slow tailoff would be: 
I. Slow Engine -~ Valve ~ Shutdown. An examination of the trace indicated 
that the Pc decayed in a normally expected manner down to 25 percent of 
full value, and then the rate was  decreased. Normal operation for a sticky 
valve would be initial slow movement rather than slow movement at the end 
of the stroke. The slow movement of a valve poppet would be caused by binding 
of the poppet within the bore because of thermal expansion, tolerance mismatch, 
o r  contamination. Since the value did move rapidly to near full  close condition, 
this mode of €ailure would appear to be unlikely. 
2. Contamination on Valve Seat. Since the valve initially did move 
rapidly to cutoff propellant flow , but appeared to not seal immediately, a 
possible explanation could be a particle imbedded in the poppet seal material. 
Since the same characterist ics a r e  noted for both starts and the propellant is 
flowed through the valve in a steady state operation, any contamination on the 
seat  holding the valve poppet off the seat would have to be imbedded to keep 
from being washed away. Since 
the burp firing also indicates a longer than usual tailoff, the possibility of 
chemical contamination buildup will be eliminated. To have caused slow tail- 
off in three instances, the particle would have had to be in the seat before sea 
level firing. 
Possibly this could cause such a Pc tailoff. 
3. Chamber Pressure Instrumentation Characteristics. The length of 
line connecting the pressure transducer to the engine chamber is longer than 
is normally designed for  this type of engine. However, since the engine is not 
a pulsing engine and operates only in a steady state firing mode, the steady 
state value indicated by the pressure transducer is independent of the length of 
line. This is not t rue for  buildup and shutdown characterist ics,  however. The 
indication of Pc tailoff would be lengthened by the amount of time required for 
the vacuum environment to empty the line of any gases. It must be noted, how- 
ever ,  that engine 4 of module 2 is instrumented in the same manner and the Pc 
tailoff was significantly faster. 
blocking the Pc line, this type of tailoff trace would be expected. 
Further,  if any kind of particle was  partially 
Several other possible causes,  such as valve seat swelling, were  ex- 
amined and eliminated. 
contamination (which' was imbedded in the teflon) on the valve seat. The 
uniqueness and minor effect of the anomaly does not indicate that any kind of 
serious problem exists, or  that it should warrant any further study. 
The most  probable cause was  determined to be a slight 
13 
Chamber Pressure Oscillations 
During the period beginning at 16 000 seconds and extending past  20 000 
seconds the chamber pressure oscillations of engine I were greater than 
nominally experienced by the attitude control engines. Oscillations of x 35 psia 
peak-to-peak were noted at a frequency of 400 hertz. By closely examining all 
of the attitude control engine Pc traces, it is noted that all engines exhibit some 
degree of rough combustion. This is a characteristic of the particular engine 
design. Oscillations at nearly the same frequency have been noted during sea 
level testing and in previous flights. The magnitude of the previously noted 
oscillations have been in the 5 to 10 percent psia peak-to-peak range. This 
type oscillation has not been the cause of any problem in the past even though 
it is undesirable. Possible causes for the oscillations are as follows: 
I. Instrumentation. The pressure transducer normal failure mode is 
a shift in calibration or  loss in reading. Pressure  transducer failure indicating 
oscillations of the type indicated in flight have not been observed in any previous 
testing. 
puts from the rate gyros verified this, indicates that the transducer was per- 
forming normally. 
perform until the end of flight. 
The fact that the engine chamber pressure was low initially, and out- 
The data indicates that the transducer w a s  continuing to  
2. High Propellant Temperature. The oscillation occurred during the 
periods of highest propellant temperatures. 
temperature were investigated in testing by the engine vendor and in system 
testing at MSFC. 
in previous ground testing. Because of propellant manifold fluid dynamics , the 
oxidizer can theoretically vaporize in the lines when the temperatures are high 
and propellant inlet pressures  drop during engine start operations. I t  is prob- 
able that these conditions existed during the chamber pressure oscillations. 
The high propellant temperature in conjunction with low propellant inlet pressure 
has  been simulated in MSFC testing, and chamber pressure oscillations very 
similar to the flight oscillations were obtained. 
The effects of high propellant 
No oscillations of the type experienced in flight w e r e  noted 
3. Reduced _____ Propellant FW. The engine that experienced oscillations 
w a s  also running with reduced chamber pressure.  A possible cause of low 
chamber pressure could be reduced propellant flow caused by a restriction in 
the propellant flow path. This would indicate a lower than nominal propellant 
inlet pressure upstream of the engine injector or  increased injector resistance. 
The propellant pressure drop necessary to cause a 15 percent drop in engine 
Pc is 
simulated in tests at MSFC. 
section. 
55 psia. The combination of ( 2 )  and reduced propellant flow was 
The result of the tests will be discussed in a later 
14 
Chamber Pressure  Decay 
The decay in chamber pressure of engines I and 3 of module I occurred 
during the period of high propellant temperatures ( Fig. 6 ) .  
temperature was the obvious suspect after reviewing the data and noting the 
correlation between the chamber pressure decay and oxidizer temperature 
rise. The result  of high engine injector and oxidizer temperature and normal 
manifold pressure oscillations would be a reduction of flow caused by vapori- 
zation of the propellant in the feed system. 
cause of the anomaly, and the test section wi l l  cover the results of the MSFC 
tests to verify the cause of the anomaly. 
The high propellant 
This was determined to be the 
Low Chamber Pressures 
Degraded performance was noted in engines I and 3 of module I and 
engines I and 2 of module 2. 
low in Pc near the beginning of APS operation and continued at those levels or  
lower throughout the mission. 
were 5 percent low in Pc would not normally be considered an anomaly since 
instrumentation, engine tolerance, etc. , would allow for this. However, for 
this mission, the low Pc values may indicate a trend. A comparison of test 
and flight engine chamber pressure is shown in Figure 7. 
Four engines were approximately 10 to 15 percent 
The remaining two attitude control engines that 
Burp firings of the engines six days before flight verified that each 
engine w a s  performing in a nominal manner. 
verification of nominal integrity. 
remained in the module for flight. 
pressurized to nominal operating pressure in a routine manner. 
indications at liftoff were that the SA-501 APS w a s  ready for flight. 
This firing 'represents the last 
The same propellants used in the burp firing 
Immediately before liftoff the A P S  was 
Thus all 
Considering the low Pc at beginning of flight the following possible 
causes w e r e  examined: 
Instrumentation e r r o r  
Change in throat area 
Engine valve malfunctions 
Particulate contamination 
Chemical contamination 
These possible causes are discussed below: 
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CHAMBER PRESSURE 
Instrumentation Error .  The first logical candidate was instrumentation. 
Since this is The magnitude of the decreased chamber pressure was M 15 psia. 
essentially sea level ambient pressure,  a shift in reference pressure of the 
transducers would be suspected. The last recorded bench calibration of the 
transducers recorded in the module log book was about the middle of 1966, 
approximately one and a half years  before flight. However, even though the 
internal reference pressure is sea level ambient, the loss of the reference 
pressure would increase rather than decrease the chamber pressure reading. 
A study of rate gyro and position indicator data by MDC also indicated that the 
suspect engines were operating in a degraded manner. Thus, it is coneluded 
that instrumentation was not the cause of the anomaly. 
Change in Throat Area. An enlargement in throat area caused by throat 
erosion or loss of throat insert  would result  in a reduction in chamber pressure. 
However, this type of engine failure has not occurred since early in the engine 
development program. Furthermore, there was no firing o r  condition that would 
cause this to occur during the period between burp firing and the first firings in 
flight. 
under the flight conditions is so remote that this mode of failure is not worthy of 
further discussion. 
The possibility that a ser ies  of throat failures would occur in one flight 
Engine Valve Malfunction. ~- The attitude control engines use  quad re- 
These valves a r e  dundant valves in each propellant line to control the flow. 
designed to eliminate a single point failure in either a fail-to-open o r  fail-to- 
close mode. Valve failure mode testing w a s  performed on these engines by the 
vendor during the development and qualification program. 
simulating both failure-to-open and failure-to-close to determine the effect 
upon the engine performance. 
series-parallel valve arrangement caused a Pc decrease of 5 psia. 
mode would not provide the characteristics noted in flight. 
exhibited nearly the same degradation early in flight, the engine valves would 
appear to be an unlikely source. 
Tests were run 
The case of a fail-closed valve in one leg of the 
Since four engines 
This failure 
The probability of valve failures of the same nature occurring at near 
the same time to produce the same result in four engines is highly unlikely. 
This reasoning would place any type of engine propellant valve malfunction in 
the same category as an improbable failure candidate. 
Particulate Contamination. - Precautions a r e  taken to ensure that no 
particulate contamination is allowed to enter the system both during buildup and 
testing and by means of fluids loaded into the module. 
cleanliness procedures imposed for all operations, and use of filters both within 
These precautions are 
the modules and in the GSE. In spite of the precautions , however , particulate 
contamination has been found in the system. Metal particles have in a number 
of instances either caused leakage past  a valve seat or  caused binding of a 
valve poppet in the bore. These problems occurred primarily during develop- 
ment testing. In none of the cases was a degradation in engine performance of 
the magnitude experienced in SA-501 flight noted. 
Examining the system (Fig. 1) , it is noted that only propellant feed 
The line size from 
lines, a fi l ter ,  propellant valves, and engine injector constitute the flow path 
from the tank outlet to the engine combustion chamber. 
the tank outlet to the filter entrance is 3/4 inches in diameter. 
feeds all engines, n6 flow restriction occurred in this section. 
levels for  the filters are 10 microns nominal and 25 microns absolute. 
retically, the maximum size particle that could pass through the filter would 
be 9. 84 x 
The clogging of the filter by particulate contamination must also be ruled out 
since the flow for  all four engines in each module passes through the filter, and 
effects of clogging would be seen on all engines alike. The size of the primary 
propellant feed line from the filter to the engines is 3/8 inches in diameter. 
The arrangement is such that the propellant flows through the filter into a 
cavity at the filter base in the propellant control module where it is fed from 
two manifolds to the engines. Thus, if flow w a s  restricted in the propellant 
control module cavity, it would be seen by all engines but if it was  restricted 
in the manifolds feeding engines 1 and 3,  then engines 2 and 4 would be unaffected 
or  vice versa.  Stated simply, the problem occurred downstream of the pro- 
pellant control module, either in the manifolds feeding the engines, o r  in the 
engines themselves . 
Since this line 
The filtration 
Theo- 
inches in diameter. The length of such a particle is indeterminate. 
Again reviewing the system, it is noted that even if the main propellant 
feed lines to the engines are blocked upstream of the engine flange the engines 
can still receive propellants through the smaller ( 1/4 inch ID) recirculation 
lines. Testing at MSFC indicates that even with the primary propellant inlet 
lines completely blocked, the engines still operate with a Pc of approximately 
85 psia. If the manifold to two engines was  restricted, the result  should be' the 
same on both engines. 
propellant flow restriction to be in the engines themselves unless the recircula- 
tion line is also restricted. 
This was not the case. This fact would indicate any 
A cutaway view of the engine is shown in Figure 3. The engine flow path 
contains a 100 mesh (filtration level of 150 microns) screen filter at the valve 
entrance (recirculation line is downstream of filter) , the solenoid operated quad 
valves, a flow control orifice at the valves outlet, 12 capillary feed tubes on the 
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oxidizer side,  one feed tube for fuel, and the engine injector. 
valves open to a distance of 0. 040 f 0. 003 inches off their seats. If contamina- 
tion blocked the opening and reduced the stroke of the poppet, leakage would 
occur. However , if the contamination had built up behind the poppet , the 
propellant flow area would be reduced in the valve open position, and no leakage 
would occur in the closed position. The reduction in movement of the poppet 
would reduce the Pc buildup rates due to  restriction of flow. In order  to cause 
Pc reductions of the order experienced in flight, at least one valve in each 
parallel leg of one propellant would have to  be affected in each engine. Partic- 
ulate contamination would not appear to be a logical condidate to cause at least 
eight valves (two in each engine) to be restricted. It is noted that the back side 
of the valve poppet is essentially a ffdead-endedff volume. Particulate contami- 
nation would be more likely to occur somewhere along the flow path, and build 
up at a flow restriction (fi l ter ,  orifice, etc. ) ra ther  than in the poppet bore. 
The propellant 
The flow control orifices have a minimum diameter of 0. 060 inches. 
The size of particle required to clog the orifice would have to be of such a size 
that it would not be able to pass through the fi l ters and valves unless it was 
fluid in nature (i. e. a chemical gel) .  
of the flow restriction. 
This would not be the most logical source 
The oxidizer is fed into the engine injector by 12 capillary feed tubes 
that a r e  nominally 0. 0355 inches in diameter and 3. 183 inches in length. 
fuel feed tube is nominally 0. 1190 inches in diameter and approximately 2. 5 
inches in length. 
inches in diameter while the twelve fuel injector holes are 0. 0283 inches in 
diameter. Again a single particle of particulate contamination required to clog 
any of the openings would not logically be able to  pass through the filters up- 
stream. Unless a particle is generated within the valve package itself, a 
particle large enough to cause the flow restriction necessary for the Pc  decay 
should not be the source of the problem. The probability that an accumulation 
of smaller particles is deposited in a flow path in four engines is unlikely 
unless all cleanliness precautions were completely ignored. The burp firings 
showed this not to be the case before lift off. 
The 
The twelve injector oxidizer holes are nominally 0. 0354 
Because of filters, sizes of lines and openings in the flow paths, and 
other factors,  it is concluded that particulate contamination (external or  
internally induced solid particles) is probably not the cause of the performance 
degradation. 
Chemical Contamination. ___ Chemical contamination for this discussion 
is defined as contamination that is generated by reactions within the system 
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between propellants, system hardware, and the ambient atmosphere. The 
following types of chemical contamination w e r e  examined: 
N2O4 flow decay 
Propellant/moisture/hardware incompatibility. 
N204 Flow Decay. The N2O4 flow decay phenomenon is one in which 
either a gel-like mass  of propellant res t r ic ts  the opening to a flow passage, or  
a mass  of material is deposited on the wa l l  of flow restrictions (orifices,  
valves, etc. ) . 
ferrous nitrate [ ( No) Fe   NO,)^ ] that is formed when the propellant has been 
stored or has been in contact with ferrous materials. It must be noted that 
not a single case of flow decay occurring in a propulsion system during a 
simulated mission propulsion test has been documented. 
have always been in tes t  facilities where an attempt was being made to induce 
the phenomena or  a long duration steady flow of propellant w a s  being passed 
through a facility to test some specific component. 
most knowledgeable on the subject, flow decay occurs when a decrease in 
temperature occurs in the propellant at a place in the system where a pressure 
drop occurs. 
required to initiate flow decay has not been thoroughly defined. Tests indicate 
that small  changes in temperature ( <  5' F) can cause the decay to begin occur- 
ring at a flow restriction. 
decay to disappear. 
The material  deposited has been determined to be crystallizable 
The instances observed 
According to personnel 
The magnitude of the temperature and pressure drops that is 
Increasing propellant temperature causes the flow 
The conditions experienced by the APS on the launch pad before flight 
and during the boost phase of flight are not considered to be conducive to flow 
decay since there was no propellant flow during this period. 
of the contaminant out of the propellant while in the quiescent state on the 
launch pad would tend to settle into the bottom of the propellant tank, and 
during flow would be expected to collect on the propellant control module filter. 
Any restriction of flow through the filter would be reflected on all engines alike. 
This did not occur. The amount of contaminant that could form in the propellant 
feed system while on the pad would be so  small that it should not clog any com- 
ponent in the system. Based on the conditions that existed in the APS, it was 
determined that N2O4 flow decay was not the cause of the anomaly. 
Any precipitation 
Propellant/Moisture/Hardware Incompatibility. Reactions can occur 
between the oxidizer (N204)  and water  to produce nitric acid, which attacks' 
many metals to some degree. Since no previous problems had been noted in 
ground testing or  flights, it was assumed that no problem existed in the basic 
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compatibiltiy of the propellant with the system materials.  Procedures for  
handling and processing of system hardware contain steps to  eliminate and 
control the amount of water that may be in the system. The resul t  of excessive 
corrosion products in the system would be either the restriqtion of flow passage 
o r  anomalous operation of components. 
discussed and determined to be unlikely causes of the low chamber pressure.  
Failures of components have been 
The other phase of the chemical corrosion is the restriction of the flow 
passages. Since study has indicated that the cause of the problem is in the 
engines, the only likely area that would experience the conditions of exposure of 
propellant flow passage hardware to a combination of propellant ( N204) and 
water is downstream of the engine valves. 
entrance to the capillary feed tubes and the injector flow passages. 
and tubes are constructed from Inconel 600 material ,  which contains a high 
percentage of nickel (70 percent) and significant percentages of iron and 
chromium. Nickel and its alloys are generally accepted as being compatible 
with anhydrous N204 but are susceptible to attack by nitric acid. 
This would include the cavity at the 
The injector 
Very little concern had been expressed about the incompatibility of the 
nitric acid and the hardware since there has been considerable testing during 
the engine development, system development and qualification, and inhouse 
MSFC testing with no apparent problem. In addition four flights of the Saturn 
I-B A P S  had not revealed any anomalies of low chamber pressure similar to  
the SA-50I flight problems. However, after examining the other possible 
causes,  this area appeared as a likely candidate for  the problem cause. 
Contacts with JPL and MSC concerning their experience with this type 
phenomenon indicated that the S-IVB APS should be susceptible to the nitric 
acid corrosion problem. 
maneuvers experienced corrosion of the injector because of the formation of 
nitric acid after the injector was exposed to N204 and water .  It w a s  reported 
that the effect of the injector corrosion was reduction in chamber pressure. 
The effect was noted in sea level tests and was postulated to have been a pos- 
sible cause of a flight engine failure. 
propellant occurred during the engine assembly hot acceptance test and sub- 
sequently, because of inadequate cleaning and contact with moisture the cor- 
rosion occurred. The MSC personnel reported that a limit had been placed on 
the time that an engine injector that is burp fired on the pad can be exposed to 
the atmospheric conditions without being cleaned. 
The engines used in the Surveyor program for Delta V 
The exposure of the Surveyor injector to 
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Another input which indicated that this phenomenon w a s  the problem 
was the results of a series of tests conducted by MDC at their Sacramento 
test facility on a Saturn V APS module. The objective of the program w a s  to 
determine the adequacy of the system to withstand extended hold periods, 
simulating launch aborts. Burp firings were conducted on the engines at the 
start of the 9O-day program and at i5-day intervals thereafter. 
Two engines began to exhibit low chamber pressure after the first 15- 
day period and continued to decrease at succeeding firings. A meeting between 
personnel from MDC and MSFC resulted in the conclusion that the problem 
could be a reduction of the oxidizer flow caused by a buildup of the nitric acid/ 
hardware corrosion products in the engine injector. It was decided that MSFC 
should conduct a series of tests on a single engine to simulate the launch pad 
conditions to verify the validity of the assumed probable cause. Results of the 
tests (which are presented in the next section of this document) indicated that 
the assumption was correct.  
MSFC TEST RESULTS 
A special test program w a s  conducted at the MSFC Test Laboratory 
Storable Propellant Facility to provide an experimental base for defining the 
APS Pc anomalies observed during the SA-50i flight. 
directed toward reproducing the SA-501 flight effect and identifying the con- 
tributing cause( s) . 
five specific phases involving single engine as well as complete module testing 
at both sea level and simulated altitude conditions. 
effort are discussed below. 
This test effort was 
To accomplish this , the test program w a s  divided into 
The results of this test 
APS Module Testing 
An initial test series w a s  conducted on the Saturn V Phase IV Test APS 
In these tests the APS engine firing density 
Module in an attempt to reproduce the Pc decay phenomenon observed in the 
latter portion of the AS-501 flight. 
was approximated and significant module temperature conditions experienced 
during the SA-501 flight w e r e  simulated. Tests were conducted in the MSFC 
Test  Laboratory i2-foot diameter altitude cell at a simulated pressure altitude 
of 120 000 feet. 
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The simulated "501" APS duty cycle, as shown in Table I, consisted of 
Each attitude control 
529 pulses on engine I, 1088 pulses on engine 2 ,  529 pulses on engine 3 ,  and 
two steady state burns totaling 420 seconds on engine 4. 
engine pulse was 65 milliseconds in duration. Before beginning the pre-pro- 
grammed firing cycle, 3-second firings were conducted on each engine to 
establish the steady state Pc operating level. Similar firings were conducted 
following the duty cycle. To provide the thermal simulation, the oxidizer 
control module , consisting of the f i l l  valve , recirculation valve , filter , and 
supply manifold, was heated beginning at 12 000-seconds into the duty cycle 
using a 2 . 5  ampere infrared lamp. A photograph showing the heating apparatus 
and the a rea  heated is shown in Figure 8. The significant events for the 19 800- 
second duration duty cycle are depicted in a time line shown in Figure 9. 
In a full simulation test, the APS module was loaded 3 to  5 days before 
a test and w a s  maintained under a 50 psig gaseous helium blanket pressure. 
Nominal day-night temperature excursions of 30" F were experienced during 
this period. The purpose of the hold w a s  to simulate KSC prelaunch groundhold 
conditions. A certain degree of GHe saturation in the propellants would be 
expected during the hold. In one test the module was loaded and the duty cycle 
conducted the day of the test to minimize the GHe saturation to determine the 
effect, if any, of saturated propellants on the Pc decay phenomenon. 
The test data revealed a significant decay in engine Pc with increase in 
propellant and engine temperature. However, for the initial 12 000 seconds of 
the tests,  there was little variation in the nominal Pc operating levels. 
exceptions to this were the times that 3- to Pminute  hold periods were incurred 
in order to  change the F-M recording tape. 
this hold exhibited reduced Pc values. However, the nominal Pc values were 
restored after two or three pulses. It was noted that the engine temperatures 
"soaked outf' at higher values during these hold periods. The dense portion 
of the firing cycle was begun at 10 900 seconds, followed by the beginning of 
heating of the oxidizer control module at 12 000 seconds. P c  decay began at 
this point ( 12 000 seconds) and continued throughout the remainder of the duty 
cycle. 
contain curves of engine Pc , engine injector wall temperature , oxidizer inlet 
temperature, and oxidizer control module ( PCM) inlet temperature versus test 
time for  a typical test. The maximum experienced Pc decay in this test pro- 
gram was 32 psia. Note that the Pc values returned to nominal during the 
post-test steady state firings. 
The 
The initial engine pulses following 
The Pc decay is best illustrated in Figures 10, 11, and 12, which 
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TABLE I. SIMULATED 17501" APS ENGINE FIRING PROGRAM 
Time 
~~ 
0-10 900 sec* 
660-750 see 
10 900-12 660 sec" 
I 1  160-11 490 sec 
12 660-19 800 sec" 
Engine I 
2 pulses/ 
100 sec 
- - 
14 pulses/ 
100 sec 
I pulse/ 
I 1 0  sec 
._ 
Engine 2 
8 pulses/ 
100 sec 
~. .
8 pulses/ 
100 sec 
1 pulse/ 
95 sec 
~~ . 
~- 
Engine 3 
I pulse/ 
250 sec 
25 pulses/ 
100 sec 
I pulse/ 
66 sec 
I 
19 800 
CUTOFF 
~ 
Engine 4 
'$ Pulse Width = 65 milliseconds 
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The results from the MSFC tests substantiated the theory that the cause 
of the decay in engine Pc was vaporization of the oxidizer in the injector and 
injector feed tubes due to elevated propellant and/or engine temperature. 
hydraulic resistance created by the presence of gas in this area restricted 
oxidizer flow, therefore resulting in the Pc drop. The cause of the N2O4 
vaporization, as stated above, was  a combination of hot hardware and hot pro- 
pellant. With the hot injector and injector tubes, a condition aggravated by high 
propellant temperature, the temperature of the N2O4 was elevated to the point 
that it gasified before reaching the injection orifices. 
Pc values were restored during the post-test steady state runs as the propellant 
inlet temperature dropped and , subsequently engine hardware temperature was 
lowered because of the continuous flow of cooler propellant through the injector 
and injector feed tubes , further substantiated oxidizer gasification as the cause 
of Pc decay. 
The 
The fact that nominal 
Gaseous helium saturation in the propellant showed no effect on the Pc 
decay phenomenon. 
engine performance in the form of low frequency combustion instability of 
* 8 to 10 psia amplitude, 300 hertz frequency. Additional discussion on the 
effect of saturation is contained in the following sub-section. 
The primary influence of GHe saturation was  in oscillatory 
Single Engine Altitude Testing 
To more specifically investigate propellant temperature effect on engine 
Pc, six tests were  conducted on one TRW attitude control engine in the MSFC 
3-fOOt diameter altitude cell as a follow-up to the previously discussed APS 
module tests. The objectives of this test ser ies  were to isolate the effects of 
saturated propellant , engine temperature , propellant temperature , and the 
combination of these variables on engine performance. 
The engine firing cycle as outlined in Table I1 w a s  utilized in each run, 
and a 3-second firing was conducted immediately after each duty cycle to obtain 
post-test steady state performance. The initial three tests used unsaturated 
oxidizer at temperatures of 80" F, 140" F, and 160" F. The last three tests 
used GHe saturated oxidizer at these same temperatures. 
The effect of GHe saturation on engine Pc  decay was  not significant. 
However, the data indicated that the saturation contributed to unstable per- 
formance with nominal Pc oscillations of * 5 to * 8 percent of rated Pc. Also 
during the initial pulses, the Pc  value decreased to as low as 70 psia as gas 
passed through the engine. 
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TABLE II. TRW SINGLE 
i 
5 
231 
ENGINE DUTY CYCLE 
3 
0 . 0 6 5  
0 . 0 6 5  
0 . 0 6 5  
0 . 0 6 5  
0 . 0 6 5  
Off-Time 
- ( sec) 
30 
0. 5 
4. 0 
2 5  
13 
60  -
Accumulated 
On-Time (sec) 
3 . 0  
0 . 3 2 5  
3 . 2 5  
6.  5 
3 . 2 5  
1 .625  
17 .95  
Total Perioc 
( sec) 
33 
2. 825 
203.,25 
2506 .5  
653 .25  
1441.625 
4840.45 
In all tests, .the Pc decay appeared to be more dependent on engine 
hardware temperature than on oxidizer temperature, since the Pc decay 
occurred during the latter portion of the duty cycle at which time the engine 
temperatures w e r e  at peak values. (Note: Pc decreases of 7 to 12 psia were  
noted in the subject tests. 1 Although the data did not yield a good indication of 
the direct  effect of oxidizer inlet temperature, it did show that this temperature 
significantly influenced the engine hardware temperature. 
(cooling) capability of the oxidizer flowing through the feed tubes and injector 
w e r e  greatly reduced with the hotter oxidizer, and therefore the engine injector 
temperature increased. Pc decay was the consequence. 
The heat transfer 
In summary, these tests substantiated the data from the module tests 
that revealed the Pc decay to be a direct  result  of oxidizer vaporization in the 
injector-feed tube area. 
temperature, which was  both a result  of the engine firing cycle and the propel- 
lant inlet temperature, was  the primary cause of the Pc decay. The Pc values 
always returned to nominal during the post-test steady state runs as the injector 
a rea  was cooled. 
Elevated injector a rea  (including the feed tubes) 
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TRW Single Engine Sea Level Testing 
Another series of tests was conducted to investigate the step function 
Pc drop noted in the 501 APS engines. 
six days earlier, and the engines, containing the residual propellants, were 
exposed to  the atmosphere during the hold period. 
conducted by MDC, Sacramento, California, resulted in similar cases of Pc 
decay. Consequently, the test program was initiated at MSFC to determine the 
relation of the Pc decay phenomenon to the interaction between propellants 
remaining in the engine at shutdown, air moisture, and engine materials. In 
support of this objective, hot firings were conducted on single TRW engines and 
the Saturn V APS module, and NzO4 flow tests were conducted on two TRW 
engine injectors. 
Pre-flight burp firings were conducted 
"Sea level-hold" tests 
The single engine testing is discussed in this section. 
Two TRW engines were hot fired in a series of 16 tests at ambient 
pressure conditions. 
tubing schematic as shown in Figure 13. 
engine inlets under 20 psig blanket pressure during hold periods. 
duty cycle for  these tests consisted of three pulses: 250 milliseconds on - 
500 milliseconds off, 65 milliseconds on - 500 milliseconds off, and 65 milli- 
seconds on. 
The engines were mounted in a "sea level" stand with the 
The standard 
Propellants were maintained at the 
The initial engine tested (TRW SN 585) exhibited a Pc  of 99 psia  and 
O/F ratio of 1. 630. After a 5-day hold period, the engine w a s  tested again, 
using the identical inlet pressures  as the first run. 
with an O/F ratio of 1. 003. The fuel flowrate remained nominal. Following 
the second test, the engine was disassembled and inspected by the Materials 
Division of P&VE Laboratory. Crystalline matter was noted at the entrance to 
the twelve 0. 035-inch diameter oxidizer injector feed tubes. Although the tube 
a rea  reduction caused by the material  did not appear to be large,  the effect of 
these particles on the tube surface roughness in the form of increased friction 
factor and reduced flow area  was such that flow restriction could be experienced. 
The Pc value was 70 psia 
A ser ies  of tests was then begun on a second TRW engine ( S N  526). An 
11 percent reduction in Pc..was noted during the initial 6-day period, and the 
Pc decreased to a low of 81 psia from the initial value of 99 psia ( 18 percent). 
Seven tests over a 21-day period were required to reach this level. A s  with 
the previous engine, the Pc decay was proportional to the decrease in oxidizer 
flow rate. In this case the O/F shift was from I. 631 to 1. 300. Fuel flow rate 
remained constant. From the low of 81 psia the Pc began to increase again 
and stabilize at 94 psia after 4 tes ts  in a 14 day period. A 10-second steady 
state run was then conducted and the Pc returned to  the nominal value of 99 psia 
after I. 5 seconds burn time. 
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TRW INJECTOR 
3, TO FACILITY BLEED LINE GHeSUPPLY 
II 
10 MICRON NOMINAL FILTER + I 1/2 IN. VENT VALVE TO SCRUBBER - 
I 
26 GALLON 
RUN TANK 
1/2 IN. 
TO 3 FT. DIAMETER 
ALTITUDE CELL 
PREVALVE FLOWMETER 
TO APS MODULE 
FIGURE 13. FACILITY SCHEMATIC FOR TRW ENGINE "SEA LEVEL" TESTS 
AND INJECTOR FLOW TESTS 
TRW Injector Flow Testing 
The particulate matter discovered in the oxidizer injector feed tubes in 
engine 585 prompted a series of injector flow tests. The injector was removed 
from a TRW engine previously fired at MSFC in APS module performance test- 
ing, and special connectors were fabricated to mate the injector oxidizer inlet 
fitting to the facility oxidizer supply line. The engine valves were replaced by 
a single facility solenoid valve to eliminate the engine valves variable. Nitrogen 
tetroxide ( N204) was  then flowed through the oxidizer injector feed tubes , 
through the injector, to the atmosphere. A protective dust cover was  placed 
over the injector following each test. 
A 5-test series was  conducted over a 16-day period on one injector 
( SN 106) , and this injector was  then removed from the stand and delivered to 
P&VE Laboratory for contaminant analysis. Microscopic examination revealed 
the presence of contamination at the entrance to the oxidizer tubes in the form 
of a greenish, jelly-like substance. 
percentage of nickel and lesser percentage of iron and chromium in the contami- 
nation. Although the injector was  open to the atmosphere for a day or  more 
during the laboratory examination, liquid was  noted in the injector. The liquid 
was  postulated to be nitric acid and litmus paper tests proved it to be acidic. 
Photographs were made and views of the contaminated portions of the injector 
are shown in Figures 14 to 17. Figure 14 shows the contamination in the 
oxidizer tubes entrance flange. Figure 15 shows the same view of a flange that 
had been cleaned. The other two photographs illustrate the difference in amount 
of corrosive attack on the front face of an injector at the outlet of the oxidizer 
tubes for two injectors, one which was  used in this test ( Fig. 16) , and one used 
in early system tests (Fig. 17) .  
Spectrographic analysis indicated a high 
APS Module "Hold" Testing 
The Saturn V Phase IV Test APS Module was  used for a series of tests 
to obtain "system'' test data on the "sea level firing-hold" induced Pc decay 
phenomenon. Initially engine number I was  fired through a duty cycle consisting 
of 3 pulses of 250, 65, and 65 milliseconds duration at ambient pressure condi- 
tions. A Pc  value of 99 psia was observed. A 9-day hold period was  incurred 
and the module was fired at a simulated altitude pressure of 100 000 feet. 
Engine number 1 Pc decayed to 84 psia. The other two attitude control engine 
Pc's were  within the nominal value tolerance, although from 2 to 3 psia low. 
The altitude cell remained evacuated for  several  minutes following the altitude 
run, thus resulting in the evaporation of residual propellants remaining 
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FIGURE 14. CONTAMINATED ENGINE INJECTOR OXIDIZER FLANGE INLET 
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FIGURE 15. CLEANED ENGINE INJECTOR OXIDIZER FLANGE INLET 
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FIGURE 16. CORROSIVE ATTACK ON INJECTOR OXIDIZER 
PASSAGE OUTLET 
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FIGURE 17. NORMAL INJECTOR OXIDIZER PASSAGE OUTLET 
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in the engines at shutdown. 
engine I Pc  returning to a nominal value of 100 psia. 
conducted on all engines resulted in the Pc values returning to 100 to I 0 1  psia 
and stabilizing. 
oxidizer injector feed tubes w e r e  "washed out" during the steady state firings. 
Additional firing cycles at altitude resulted in 
Steady state firings 
Apparently small  amounts of contaminants contained in the 
Test S u m ma ry 
The APS module and TRW single engine tests discussed under APS 
Module Testing and Single Engine Altitude Testing revealed that Pc decay 
occurred as a result  of oxidizer vaporization in the engine injector and injector 
feed tubes. Elevated temperature in the injector ,area, which includes the 
twelve oxidizer feed tubes, w a s  the cause of vaporization. 
was dependent on both the engine firing cycle and the propellant inlet tempera- 
ture. 
the injector a rea  w a s  cooled. 
This temperature 
The Pc  values always returned to nominal during steady-state runs as 
The primary results derived from the single engine and APS module 
hot firing tests and the injector flow tests discussed under TRW Single Engine 
Sea Level Testing, TRW Injector Flow Tests,  and APS Module "Hold" Testing 
are summarized below. 
When an engine was fired at ambient pressure,  and then allowed to stand 
with residual propellants, a marked Pc decay occurred in subsequent firings. 
The Pc  decay was a direct  consequence'of decreased oxidizer flow; the fuel flow 
remained nominal. 
the entrance of the oxidizer injector feed tubes. Analysis of injectors following 
N204  flow tests revealed this material to be primarily constituted of nickel, 
with lower percentages of iron and chromium. The oxidizer feed tubes a r e  
constructed of Inconel 600, which contains greater than 70 percent nickel with 
significant percentages of chromium and iron. Therefore, oxidizer combined 
with the moist air to form nitric acid, which in turn apparently reacted with 
the Inconel to form nickel nitrate and/or ferrous nitrate compounds, which 
caused the flow restriction. 
The oxidizer flow decay w a s  caused by material buildup at 
During steady state firings of several seconds duration, the Pc values 
returned to nominal as the restricting material  appeared to wash out. 
The APS engine firing data, although limited, indicated no occurrence 
The obvious of Pc  decay in tests conducted following a prior test at altitude. 
conclusion here is that the residual propellant w a s  vaporized at the vacuum 
conditions, and thusly the oxidizer-metal reaction was precluded. 
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Engine firings, even after several days hold period, that followed prior 
steady state firings of several seconds ( I O  or  more) at ambient pressure condi- 
tions, indicated no Pc decay. Apparently the engine became hot enough during 
the extended run to vaporize any residual propellants. 
CONCLUS IONS 
The APS anomalies experienced during the SA-501 flight were: 
1. High propellant temperature 
2. Slow chamber pressure decay of ullage engine 
3 .  Chamber pressure oscillations 
4. Chamber pressure decay 
5 .  Low chamber pressure.  
After investigating the anomalies and performing a series of tests to 
verify the assumed causes of the problems, it was concluded that the high 
propellant temperature and low chamber pressure anomalies warranted 
remedial action to preclude possible future mission problems. 
The testing at MSFC verified that the 501 flight APS gradual chamber 
pressure decay and oscillations, noted in the latter portion of the mission, 
were a direct result  of the high propellant temperature.  Although the high 
propellant temperature was in part a result of the unique 501 mission profile 
(not typical for Apollo) , flight data analysis showed that the passive thermal 
control for the APS was less than expected. Thus, a need for  additional 
thermal isolation of the propellant feed system is needed. The solution, 
implemented by MDC, is the addition of: ( 1) new radiation shields in  the 
propellant manifold area inside of the module, ( 2 )  fiberglass covers over 
the servicing disconnects located externally on the aft end of the module to 
shield them from direct solar heating, and (3 )  new brackets that attach the 
propellant lines to the primary structure which will serve as thermal insulators 
to prevent conduction of heat from the structure into the propellant lines. The 
design changes were based upon the results of analytical studies performed by 
MDC and should correct the problem. 
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The low APS chamber pressures observed throughout the 501 flight 
represent degradation of engine performance, although possibly one the system 
could endure without serious mission consequences. This performance 
degradation has been reproduced in  post flight ground test and found to be a 
result of clogging in  the oxidizer flow passages. It appears to be a function of 
the number of t imes that the engine is burp fired, the period of exposure to sea 
level conditions, and other factors such as temperature of the hardware, 
relative humidity of the a i r ,  orientation of the engine, and vacuum exposure. 
The degree to which each independent factor affects the engine performance is 
unknown and would require a significant amount of testing in a stringently 
controlled environment to determine. A s  stated in previous sections, the 
problem has  been experienced in  other systems and the effect of a combination 
of Nz04 and water on Inconel has  been studied in the past. However, because 
no similar anomalies had been experienced in the S-IB Flights o r  ground tes ts ,  
the problem was not considered to be serious. The reason for  this inherent 
problem not being identified earlier is probably twofold. 
for  forming the obstructing residue were negated during most system tests 
and single engine tests by either the fact that engines were purged with GN, 
following test and/or the test firing cycle was such that sufficient heat was 
generated within the engine to vaporize all residual propellants. Secondly, 
there is evidence that the obstructing residue is relatively soft and easily 
washed out at sea level conditions; however, under vacuum conditions this 
residue may become crystalline and extremely difficult to dislodge. The second 
reason is considered the possible key as to why the low chamber pressure 
problem was peculiar to the Saturn V and not experienced during Saturn IB 
flights. 
V compared to 2 minutes for Saturn IB. 
by the APS prior to initial firing in  flight is different for Saturn IB. 
results to determine the effect of these vslriables on the clogging phenomenon a re  
not yet available, but testing effort is underway. 
Firstly, conditions 
The time line from lift-off to initial APS firing is 8 minutes for Saturn 
In addition, the level of vacuum seen 
Test 
The conclusion is that the low chamber pressure was caused by chemical 
contamination; specifically, reactions between nitric acid and engine injector 
hardware caused the oxidizer flow passages to be clogged. The nitric acid 
was formed by allowing the oxidizer to come in contact with moisture in the 
ambient air on the launch pad. 
probable cause of the flight anomaly. 
The testing at MSFC has verified this to be the 
The solution to the problem is to not expose the engine injector to N204 
and wateq and to not hold at sea level condition for  sustained periods of t ime 
(days) . The method to accomplish this is the deletion of the burp firing re- 
quirement before launch. This is being implemented and should eliminate 
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further problems of this nature. 
checkout, loading, and launch procedures so that the deletion of the burp firing 
does not cause any significant decrease in confidence that the system is ready 
for  flight. 
Enough confidence has  been gained in the 
The other anomaly was the slow chamber pressure decay of the ullage 
engine. The probable cause was attributed to a small  particle of contamination 
imbedded in the engine valve seat. This is considered to  be a random occur- 
rence, and only careful adherence to cleanliness requirements would be any aid 
in eliminating the problem. No effect on the mission w a s  noted due to the 
occurrence, and it is not considered to be worthy of any further study except to 
watch for any future occurrences. 
In conclusion, it is considered that with the modification of hardware 
Further 
and launch procedures being implemented, that the SA-50i APS flight anomalies 
have been identified and their causes eliminated for future flights. 
testing to provide a more definitive explanation to some of the assumptions is 
still in  progress and should be useful in future designs. 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama, January 1969 
904-24-03-0000-50-529 
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